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Faith, Belief and Fictionalism

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contributor authorMalcolm, Finlay
contributor authorScott, Michael
date accessioned2018-04-12T15:00:23Z
date available2018-04-12T15:00:23Z
date issued2017-12-27
identifier citationMalcolm , F & Scott , M 2017 , ' Faith, Belief and Fictionalism ' Pacific Philosophical Quarterly , vol 98 , no. S1 , pp. 257-274 . DOI: 10.1111/papq.12169en
identifier issn0279-0750
identifier otherPURE: 12584082
identifier otherPURE UUID: 851f8115-586c-4347-a117-6d541021b891
identifier otherBibtex: urn:49ec573a9d89ebb99c9ebab791dced60
identifier otherScopus: 84994559121
identifier uri
descriptionThis is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Finlay Malcolm and Michael Scott, ‘Faith, Belief and Fictionalism’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, December 2017, which has been published in final form at DOI: Under embargo until 5 August 2018. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.en
description abstractIs propositional religious faith constituted by belief? Recent debate hasfocussed on whether faith may be constituted by a positive non-doxastic cognitivestate, which can stand in place of belief. This article sets out and defends thedoxastic theory. We consider and reject three arguments commonly used infavour of non-doxastic theories of faith: (1) the argument from religious doubt;(2) the use of ‘faith’ in linguistic utterances; and (3) the possibility of pragmaticfaith. We argue that belief is required to maintain a distinction between genuinefaith, pretend faith, and fictionalist faith.en
language isoeng
relation ispartofPacific Philosophical Quarterlyen
titleFaith, Belief and Fictionalismen
contributor institutionSchool of Humanitiesen
identifier doi
description versionauthorsversionen
description statusPeer revieweden
date embargoedUntil05-08-20

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