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The Doing and the Deed : Action in Normative Ethics

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contributor authorSandis, Constantine
contributor editorO'Hear, Anthony
date accessioned2018-04-12T15:05:13Z
date available2018-04-12T15:05:13Z
date issued2017-08-24
identifier citationSandis , C 2017 , The Doing and the Deed : Action in Normative Ethics . in A O'Hear (ed.) , Philosophy of Action . vol. 80 , Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , vol. 80 , Cambridge University Press , Cambridge .en
identifier isbn9781108414890
identifier otherPURE: 10918377
identifier otherPURE UUID: 4eeff42d-a14a-4eb6-baf8-bf58e8fc8857
identifier uri
identifier uri
descriptionThis material has been published in Philosophy of Action edited by Anthony O'Hear. This version is free to view and download for personal use only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © 2017 Selection and editorial matter, Anthony O’Hear, individual chapters, the contributors.en
description abstractThis essay is motivated by the thought that the things we do are to be distinguished from our acts of doing them. I defend a particular way of drawing this distinction before proceeding to demonstrate its relevance for normative ethics. Central to my argument is the conviction that certain ongoing debates in ethical theory begin to dissolve once we disambiguate the two concepts of action in question. If this is right, then the study of action should be accorded a far more prominent place within moral philosophy than previously supposed. I end by considering an extension of the above to aesthetic evaluation and, mutatis mutandis, that of our lives in general.en
language isoeng
publisherCambridge University Press
relation ispartofPhilosophy of Actionen
relation ispartofseriesRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplementsen
titleThe Doing and the Deed : Action in Normative Ethicsen
typeBook chapteren
contributor institutionSchool of Humanitiesen
contributor institutionPhilosophyen
description versionauthorsversionen

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